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We, the people, still believe that our obligations as Americans are not just to
ourselves, but to all posterity. We will respond to the threat of climate change,
knowing that the failure to do so would betray our children and future generations. . . .
Some may still deny the overwhelming judgment of science, but none can avoid the
devastating impact of raging fires and crippling drought and more powerful storms.
—President Barack Obama1
The rationality and irrationality of science are questions never only of the present
and the past, but also for the possible future. We can learn from our mistakes—which
also means that an alternative science is always possible. Not only an alternative
theory, but an alternative theory of cognition, an alternative relationship of theory and
practice, and an alternative practice of this relationship.
—Ulrich Beck2
“Perhaps”—one must [il faut] always say perhaps for justice. There is an avenir for
justice and there is no justice except to the degree that some event is possible which,
as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations and so forth.
—Jacques Derrida3
By the end of 2013, several new climate-related records had been set:
twelve of the warmest years ever recorded had occurred between 1988–
2013; Arctic ice was at its smallest measured size; and no one under the age
of twenty-eight had experienced amonth of below-average global temper-
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ature.4 In addition, glaciers had melted; plant and animal seasonal behav-
ior had shifted; heat waves were more frequent; and droughts and intense
tropical cyclone activity had increased. Not only are these changes, pre-
dicted decades ago by climate scientists, likely to continue, but more
changes are expected: increased thaw in permafrost regions; precipitation
increases in high latitudes and decreases in subtropical land regions; and
decreased water resources in semiarid areas, such as the western United
States.5
That global warming has been predicted for at least a century and yet
little has been done in response—and, even worse, that many in 2013 still
did not believe in human-caused global warming—has horrified and per-
plexedmany. Despite the scientific consensus on its existence, a poll by the
Georgetown Climate center in 2013 revealed that the majority of the US
public (54 percent) did not believe, or were unsure, that humans were
responsible for global warming, even though 75 percent of the sameAmer-
icans surveyed did believe that the globe is getting warmer and 87 percent
supported Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action to establish
and enforce greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for power plants
and large industries.6
To explain this situation, many popular and scholarly analyses have
portrayed the debate as one of science versus politics; climate change
deniers, they contend, foster, or suffer from, politically motivated ir-
rationality. Such studies and undercover operations have focused on
the ways in which the George C. Marshall, the Heartland, and other
conservative institutes have helped to produce doubts about the sci-
ence driving these projections by sponsoring the work of climate
change skeptics and by promoting this work in the media and in
4. See Lily Kuo, “If You’re Younger Than 28, You’ve Never Experienced a Month of Below
Average Global Temperature,” Quartz, 22 July 2013, qz.com/106814/if-youre-under-the-age-of-
28-youve-never-experienced-a-month-of-below-average-global-temperature/
5. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “Global Climate Change:
Vital Signs of the Planet,” climate.nasa.gov/effects
6. See Georgetown Climate Center, “Polling Released Today by the Georgetown Climate
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schools.7 Investigators have also, as the opening quotation from Obama 
reveals, taken aim at the irrationality of so-called climate change skep-
tics, who are not skeptics but deniers. Indeed, these so-called skeptics 
are in denial, unwilling to acknowledge not only the validity of scien-
tific evidence and models but also the reality—such as raging fires, 
crippling drought, and more powerful storms—that bites them. Sev-
eral influential analyses have also linked denials of the existence of 
global climate change to general criticism and critiques of science; cli-
mate change activists such as Hadyn Washington and John Cook have 
argued that postmodern or poststructuralist theory fuels the deniers’ 
position by justifying their skepticism.8 Bruno Latour has, in response 
to conservative strategies to foment doubt regarding scientific facts, 
distanced science studies from traditional Enlightenment critique, 
which “debunk[s],” by calling for a second empiricism that—following 
Donna Haraway—seeks “to protect and to care.”9
Documenting the actions of conservatives to misrepresent the scientific 
consensus regarding global warming and creating coalitions between sci-
entists and science studies are important, and who can be against caring for 
and protecting the planet? This essay, however, revisits and reformulates 
some of the fundamental assumptions driving the debate over global cli-
mate change in order to help pave other paths forward. Accepting the 
debate as one of science versus politics ignores the fact that both sides 
claim that they are scientific and the other is political. As Naomi Oreskes 
and Erik Conway have shown, the “merchants of doubt” have been so 
successful because they themselves are—or have been—scientists.10 This 
framing also glosses over questions raised by global climate change about 
the assumed causal relationships between evidence and reality, reality and 
truth. These questions not only trouble the separation of science from 
politics, model from evidence, but also, and more importantly, the normal 
and normative relationship between understanding and agency. To return 
to the poll numbers cited earlier, it is fascinating that, whether or not
7. See Hadyn Washington and John Cook, Climate Change Denial: Heads in the Sand (New 
York, 2011); Naomi Oreskes and Erik M.Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of 
Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York, 
2010); Suzanne Goldenberg, “Leak Exposes How Heartland Institute Works to Undermine 
Climate Science,” The Guardian, 14 Feb. 2012, www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/feb/15/
leak-exposes-heartland-institute-climate; and Goldberg, “Heartland Institute Claims Fraud 
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environment/2012/feb/15/heartland-institute-fraud-leak-climate
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people think that human-caused global warming is true, a vast majority
believe that the world is getting warmer, and an even greater majority
believe that the EPA should regulate greenhouse gas emissions. (It is also
telling that global climate change science is something to be believed in
rather than known.) Instead of action following certainty, action seems to
precede it; further, truth—causality—does not seem to be necessary for
certainty. The Enlightenment model, which framed good action as stem-
ming from correct knowledge and experience, no longer holds (if it ever
did). Big data algorithms, which trumpet correlation over causality and
which reveal the increasing divide between what is empirically observed
(real) and what is true, further demote the place of causality.11 Given that
almost any correlation can now be divined, how do we know which cor-
relations are essential andwhich are accidental?Does causality evenmatter
if supplemental correlations are better predictors and amplifiers of action?
Further, what knowledge inspires action? Given this troubling of causal
inference, the pressing questions in terms of combatting global climate
change are: How can we understand and use this loosening of correlation
and causality to register the impacts of global climate change?Andhow can
we act on this desire for regulation rather than prolong inaction by engag-
ing in possibly endless debates about the reasons for inaction?
To answer these questions, I argue we should neither celebrate nor
condemn as hyperreal scientific models that are necessary to engage with
the invisible, inexperienceable risks that, as Ulrich Beck argued in the mid
1980s, define ourmodernity (seeRS). Instead of treatingmodels as capable
of replacing the phenomena they represent—instead of assuming that
code is everything (reference, legislation, execution)—we should employ
them as hypo-real tools, that is, as tools for hypothesis. This is especially
important because, if models work properly as evidence, they become un-
verifiable: if we are convinced of their verisimilitude, we will act in such a
way that their predicted results can never be corraborated by experience.
Indeed, to wait for these models’ calculations to be verified—for their
accuracy to be proven—is to give up on the future by rewriting political
problems as ones that science can (dis-)solve. We need to address uncer-
tainty as enabling rather than disabling, for it is by engaging this changing
relationship between what is true and verifiable, theoretical and empirical,
that we can form new associations between knowing and doing—new
theories of cognition and new habits of correlation—that treat the nonex-
11. I am deeply grateful to conversations with Roberto Tamassia, Joseph Hogan, Steven
Lubar, and Harriette Hemmasi on the changing relationship between correlation and causality
in light of big data.
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act coincidence between scientific predictions and observed reality as the
promise, rather than the end, of science and of politics. As I hypothesize at
the end of this essay, habits—creative anticipations based on repetition—
are key to building responses to combat global climate change and to
registering and negotiating unimaginable, invisible, and seemingly inex-
perienceable causalities and correlations.
Just the Facts, Please
The fact that the earth’s atmosphere warms the planet and the fact that
hydrocarbons play a key role in this greenhouse effect have been known for
almost two centuries. There is no debate about the existence of greenhouse
gases. The debate—or controversy—is over the impact of human activity
(mostly the burning of hydrocarbons) on the earth’s atmosphere, and this
debate is as old as the discovery of the earth’s atmosphere’s warming effect
on the planet.12 Although, as Oreskes notes, the earliest claims that the
human burning of fossil fuels could raise global temperatures were radical
conjectures, global climate change has moved from conjecture to scientif-
ically accepted fact.13 As Michael E. Mann’s famous (or infamous) hockey-
stick diagram of the Northern Hemisphere mean temperature based on
proxy climate indicators and long instrumental records reveals, the earth’s
temperature has increased dramatically since the 1950s.14 Although specific
weather patterns and events such as volcanic eruptions can certainly affect
climate—and they have affected it in the past—they alone cannot explain
this increase, which coincides with the accelerating human burning of
hydrocarbons.15 Thus the fact that humans are responsible for global
warming—and thus can also do something to mitigate it—is easily and
logically inferred. Even scientific research funded by deniers of global cli-
mate change has proven its existence. Most famously, the physicist Rich-
ard Muller, who received funding from the Charles Koch Foundation to
reexamine historical global temperature readings in response to his criti-
cism of Mann’s homogenizing of raw data, concluded that the hockey-stick 
effect was more extreme than initially estimated.16 Muller’s about-face re-
5
garding the existence of global climate change garnered him an award
from Foreign Policy.
So, why has this scientific consensus not spurred greater certainty
among the public?
Given the concerted effort by scientists, advocates, and evenHollywood
directors to spread the message about global climate change, the lack of
information is not the issue. If anything, the lingering doubts over the
existence of human-caused climate change have revealed the limitations of
information dissemination as an effective program for political change; as
humanitarian activists have recognized for decades, knowledge does not
guarantee action.17 In response, many activists (and “rogue scientists”) have
supplemented this effort by documenting the actions of conservative organi-
zations to create irrational doubt by deploying the same tactics—and in some
cases the sameconsultants—as the tobacco industry.18According toWashing-
ton and Cook, authors of a popular book and website on the topic, those
denying global climate change: (a) construct conspiracy theories about the
intentions andactionsof climate scientists; (b) cite scientific experts inoutside
fields; (c) raise impossible expectations regardingwhat climate science can tell
us; (d)misrepresent evidence; (e) employ logical fallacies, and (f) cherry-pick
evidence.19 By doing so, they strive to prolong debate over global climate
change and thus delay any proposed regulations. Washington and Cook also
link the actions of global climate change deniers to postmodernism: this “ide-
ology,” they contend, creates a fertile atmosphere for denial because, “instead
of espousing clarity, certitude,wholeness andcontinuity . . . [it] commits itself
to ‘ambiguity, relativity, fragmentation, particularity and discontinuity.’”20
Postmodernism’s abandonment of rationality and reality, its denial of grand
narratives, and its mantra that everything is relative prevents us from dream-
ing of a solution.21 Again, Bruno Latour, in horrified response to the reso-
nances between his critique of scientific facts and Republican strategies, has
advocated for constructivism, a “second empiricism” focused on protection
and care, rather than debunking and deconstruction (“W,” p. 232).
The guiding assumption—shared by those on either side of the
debate—is that uncertainty fosters inaction. This was clearly articulated in
a memorandum by Luntz Research Companies, given to the New York
17. See Thomas Keenan, “Publicity and Indifference (Sarajevo on Television),” PMLA 117
(Jan. 2002): 104–16.
18. See Kuo, “If You’re Younger Than 28, You’ve Never Experienced a Month of Below
Average Global Temperature.”
19. See Washington and Cook, Climate Change Denial, pp. 43–70.
20. Ibid., p. 113.
21. See ibid., p. 113.
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Times by the Environmental Research Group. In it, Frank Luntz, a Repub-
lican strategist, states: “‘should the public come to believe that the scien-
tific issues are settled . . . their views about global warming will change 
accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scientific 
certainty a primary issue’” (“W,” p. 226). (The New York Times reporting of 
this memorandum inspired Latour’s reformulation of science studies [see 
“W,” p. 227].)
To what extent, though, does uncertainty drive inaction and under-
mine science? More pointedly, given the centuries-long debate over the 
validity of evolution, ongoing questions over the efficacy and ethics of 
vaccines and vaccinations, and revelations about Nazi science, on what 
planet is the questioning of science and scientists news? Debate and dis-
pute have been central not only to the historical reception of science but 
also to scientific progress; from the debate between Ptolemaic and Coper-
nican astronomy to competing theories of genetics (Mendelian and bio-
metric), science has advanced via dispute and uncertainty (hence Thomas 
Kuhn’s famous paradigm shifts).22 Further, uncertainty is central to cau-
sality; we infer something because we do not already know it.23
If anything, the debilitating debate over climate change continues, not 
because of the simple existence of scientific disagreement, but rather be-
cause of the bizarre notion that scientific issues can ever be settled, that 
evidence can ever be complete, that understanding requires certainty, and 
that consensus is the end of a discussion and not, as Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard 
has argued, a particular state.24 The debate continues, that is, because of the 
reification of science as absolute and certain; a significant number of those 
who have reservations regarding the existence of global climate change are 
not dupes, ideologues, or postmodern theorists but rather vocal support-
ers of science.
So Successful It’s Not
According to a 2008 Pew Research Center poll, skepticism about global 
warming decreases with higher education among Democrats but increases 
with higher education among Republicans.25 This result seems to fly in the 
face of two assumptions that buttress debates about global climate change
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and about higher education respectively: one, that those uncertain about
global climate change are uneducated, and, two, that higher education
breeds liberalism. Rather than dismiss this result as a curious fact—or
simply as evidence of bad faith by educated conservatives—weneed to take
it seriously, for it shows the ties between Enlightenment and liberal (and
now neoliberal/libertarian) markets. It also reveals the extent to which the
climate change debate is not due to the failures of science but rather, as
Beck has pointed out, to its successes.26
Educated conservatives’ refusal to accept scientific expertise resonates
with the Enlightenment motto of “sapere aude! Have the courage to use
your own understanding!”27 Those doubting climate change science are
arguably following Immanuel Kant’s creed “to make use of one’s under-
standing without the guidance of another” (albeit this questioning is di-
rected at secular, rather than religious, leaders).28 As Michel Foucault has
argued in “What Is Critique?” this Enlightenment stance is profoundly
political because it is linked to “the art of not being governed so much,”
that is, how not to be governed like that.29 Through this critical attitude,
which separates power from truth, “the subject gives itself the right to
question truth concerning its power effects and to question power about
its discourses of truth. Critique will be the art of voluntary inservitude, of
reflective indocility.”30 Foucault’s linking of Enlightenment to governmen-
tality also makes clear neoliberalism’s Enlightenment—that is, liberal—
heritage. Neoliberalism’s embrace of “how not to be governed somuch” is
not an anathema to the Enlightenment but rather its anthem. Thus it is not
surprising that the tools of the Enlightenment to support science have, as
Latour notes, become tools against science: if “the Enlightenment profited
largely from the disposition of a very powerful descriptive tool, that of
matters of fact, which were excellent for debunking quite a lot of beliefs,
powers, and illusions, it found itself totally disarmed once matters of fact,
in turn, were eaten up by the same debunking impetus” (“W,” p. 232).
26. “It is not their failure but their success that has dethroned the sciences. One could even
say, the more successfully the sciences have operated in this century, that much faster and more
thoroughly have their original validity claims been relativized. . . . The model of primary
scientization is based on the ‘naivete´’ that the methodical skepticism of the sciences can be
institutionalized on the one hand, and yet be limited to the objects of the science on the other”
(RS, p. 163).
27. Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” inWhat Is
Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, trans. James
Schmidt et al., ed. Schmidt (Berkeley, 1996), p. 58.
28. Ibid.
29. Michel Foucault, “What Is Critique?” trans. Kevin Paul Geiman, inWhat Is
Enlightenment? p. 384.
30. Ibid., p. 386.
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Intentionally or not, through accident or catastrophes, in war or
peace, a large group of the population faces devastation and destruc-
tion today, for which language and the powers of our imagination fail
us, for which we lack any moral or medical category. We are con-
cerned with the absolute and unlimited NOT, which threatens us
Latour’s insight echoes Beck’s much earlier analysis of the impact on 
modernity by imperceptible secondary risks, such as the possibilities of 
catastrophic environmental damage posed by industrial pollutants (tell-
ingly, the best strategy to combat climate change by the US government 
has been through the Clean Air Act). Unlike Latour, Beck argues that the 
deployment of the scientific method against science is not simply bad, for 
it also demonopolizes science; it represents the success of the scientific 
method. According to Beck, the methods of science “skepticism” and en-
lightenment are being employed against science by lay people (who Beck 
portrays as initially “driven out of their ‘hunting grounds’ and pushed 
back into ‘reservations’ like Indians” during the primary period of scien-
tization) (RS, p. 158). Risk society releases the “natives,” armed with scien-
tific modes of critique, and this is essential because, as Beck makes clear, 
science is necessary because risk entails politics.
Writing in the 1980s—in the spirit of, rather than against, postmodern 
inquiry—Beck revealed that we are living in an era of “reflexive modern-
ization.” In this era, which is “post” modernity, “modernization within the 
paths of industrial society is being replaced by a modernization of the 
principles of industrial society” (RS, p.  10). In reflexive modernity, mainly 
imperceptible secondary effects become primary; what is central is not 
industrial production but the management of risks produced by industri-
alization. Reflexive modernity is not about wealth in an era of scarcity but 
rather pending catastrophe in an era of consumption; risk is a “systematic 
way of dealing with the hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modernization itself” (RS, p.  21). Modernization, that is, has “consumed and 
lost its other and now undermines its own premises as an industrial society 
along with its functional principles” (RS, p. 10). In reflexive modernity, the 
“sciences are confronted with their own products, defects, and secondary 
problems” rather than nature per se (RS, p. 155). Because of this, what was 
initially considered private or outside the political—industrial produc-
tion—becomes a public concern; politics extends to the private manage-
ment of plants and others (see RS, p.  24).
Importantly, these risks and hazards—which define the present and 
future—are imperceptible to normal human perception and escape the 
powers of the human imagination. Most bluntly:
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here, the un- in general, unimaginable, unthinkable, un-, un-, un-.
[RS, p. 52]
In the world of the NOT—in the world of the unimaginable—what mat-
ters most is not what is real, if by real we mean what can be empirically
experienced. These risks, which threaten irreversible and invisible harm,
can only be causally inferred via physical and chemical formulas using
technological devices. This creates an extremely difficult situation inwhich
“‘second-hand non-experience’” guides action and perception (RS, p. 72).
These nonexperienced risks have to be believed:
In order to recognize risks at all and make them the reference point of
one’s own thought and action, it is necessary on principle that invisi-
ble causality relationships between objectively, temporally, and spa-
tially very divergent conditions, as well as more or less speculative
projections, be believed, that they be immunized against the objections
that are always possible. [RS, p. 72]
This belief entails accepting as true speculative projections based on evi-
dence taken under divergent conditions (climate proxies). Once they are
believed to be true, they become real and immediate: “the invisible—even
more, that which is by nature beyond perception, that which is only con-
nected or calculated theoretically—becomes the unproblematic element of
personal thought, perception and experience” (RS, p. 72).
This situation of the NOT reverses the normal logic of experience, in-
deed, the very idea that one learns from experience. One no longer moves
from personal experience to general judgment; rather,
general knowledge devoid of personal experience becomes the central
determinant of personal experience. Chemical formulas and reac-
tions, invisible pollutant levels, biological cycles and chain reactions
have to rule seeing and thinking if one wishes to go to the barricades
against risks. . . . Furthermore, ultimately no one can know about
risks, so long as to know means to have consciously experienced.
[RS, p. 72]
Risks pose serious challenges to empirical thought and philosophy, not
simply because causes have to be believed—as David Hume among others
has argued, inference always entails belief—but also andmore importantly
because experience (sense impressions) can no longer ground morality or
correct our theories and imaginings. Belief, causality, and reason, Gilles
Deleuze reminds us, all transcend experience and transfer the past to the
future, but “the object of belief [must] be determined in accordance with a
past experience” (ES, p. 71). Past experience, in particular the regularity of
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knowledge of secondary effects, by now a sufficiently differentiated
branch of knowledge, is always (potentially) present. The broadest
variety of consequences and recursive causal patterns must thus be
weighed in their meaning for themselves and others. In this way, the
actual consequences ultimately become more and more incalculable,
because the possible effects become more and more estimable and
their assessment takes place more and more in the research process
and in interaction with its inherent taboo zones, and determine those
zones in the course of results. [RS, p. 171]
This exactly describes the odd temporality—the lack of verifiability—of
models mentioned earlier. Because we can estimate andmore importantly
act on the possible effects before they happen, estimated effects become
unverifiable; but, as Beck stresses, this unverifiability or incalculability
does not mean total darkness. Secondary effects—the risks—can be antic-
ipated, even if their consequences cannot be exactly calculated or known.
(InHume’s terms, risks affect experience, but not habit/inference).32Thus,
in terms of global climate change, debating the lack of precision regarding
predictions screens the general estimability of this change as well as the
dynamic relationship between estimability and calculability.
Crucially, the difference between anticipation and exact consequence
does not detract from politics or these models but makes politics possible
and these models necessary. Beck stresses that risk society does not simply
31. In many ways, this echoes the position of computer programmers: one does not know
all the minute calculations a computer makes, and yet one can still control a computer’s
actions. For more on this, see Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Programmed Visions: Software and
Memory (Cambridge, Mass., 2011).
32. See Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, pp. 68–9.
contiguous events, correct belief and habit by creating a calculus of quan-
tities (philosophical probability) that can sift the essential from the acci-
dental. With risks, as I discuss later, we lose both the ability of experience 
to inspire belief through its registering of conjunctive cases (which become 
causal through habit and anticipation) and its ability to correct causality by 
grounding philosophical probability.
Risks further challenge empiricism by undermining calculation; these 
unknowable risks are incalculable, if by calculable one means exact calcu-
lation. These risks, however, are estimable, which means that the old rela-
tionship between calculability and control no longer holds. One can 
control and access incalculable secondary effects; one does not need to 
know exactly in order to control.31 Beck stresses that decreasing calculabil-
ity and increasing estimability are inextricably linked because the
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rob people of their sense perceptions—it does not simply make the real
imaginary and the imaginary real—it also gives them greater access to the
science of risks and opens science to nonscientists. Risks must be defined
using scientific formulas, but risk—what counts as an acceptable level of
risk—is defined politically. Science, that is, “becomes more and more
necessary, but at the same time, less and less sufficient for the socially
binding definition of truth” (RS, p. 156). Risk society thus entails deci-
sion in the most rigorous sense of the word. It entails what Derrida has
called the undecideable: “the experience of that which, though foreign
and heterogeneous to the order of the calculable and the rule, must . . .
nonetheless . . . deliver itself over to the impossible decision while
taking account of law and rules.”33
Remarkably, though, global climate change has been framed as a no-
brainer: a decision that should entail no decision. The necessity for a de-
cision has led to an aversion to all decisions and a rewriting of political
questions into ones that science can—or more properly should—solve.
Evenmore perversely, this deferral is based on the successes of science and
the alleged inevitability of Enlightenment. If Enlightenment tools have
been eaten up by the same debunking impetus, it is because of the confi-
dence placed in the outcomes of the Enlightenment, namely the assump-
tion that enlightenment is inevitable should the public be granted “the
freedom to make a public use of one’s reason in all matters.”34 This confi-
dence in scientific consensus as truth has become amplified in the era of
scientific models and CSI. In response to the unimaginable and the unde-
cideable, we have produced a scientific and technological imaginary that
allegedly needs neither imagination nor decision.
Science: Without Experience
As Washington and Cook contend, doubts regarding global climate
change stem in part from the impossible expectations of science. These
impossible expectations—which are arguably present on both sides of the
debate—expose changing expectations regarding the efficacy of scientific
evidence, changes linked to narratives about and of science. Doubts re-
garding human causes of global warming are the obverse of what lawyers
have called the CSI effect. The incredibly popular CSI franchise (CSI was
the most watched series in the world in 2012)35 often features fantastic
33. Derrida, “Force of Law,” p. 252.
34. Kant, “An Answer to the Question,” p. 59.
35. See anon., “Most-Watched Television Show in the World Is ‘CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation,’” Huffington Post, 14 June 2012, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/14/most
-watched-tv-show-in-the-world-csi_n_1597968.html
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technologies, which allegedly close the gap between conjecture and reality 
because they definitively reveal what happened and when: DNA extracted 
from a strand of hair unfailingly exposes the criminal. In these cases, there 
is little or no deduction—little or no inference—because the evidence 
speaks for itself, once it has been properly technologically manipulated. 
Action also naturally follows from evidence because it clearly demarcates 
what has been done and thus what should be done in response. Because of 
CSI, lawyers are finding juries increasingly unwilling to convict on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence, of deduction rather than forensics.36 Rea-
sonable doubt is becoming anything that requires human (rather than 
technological) inference, anything that requires personal experience 
(rather than chemical formulae) as a basis for judgment. CSI—and the 
logic of preemption that it also makes possible—thus represents one pow-
erful and imagined response to unimaginable risks: the imaginary doing 
away with the role of the imagination. If risks call inferences into question 
because they are inexperienceable, CSI and the forensic imagination close 
the gap between scientific result and evidence by making scientific decision—
the drawing of a conclusion, the testing of a hypothesis—no decision; 
technologically mediated evidence (humanly inexperienceable sensa-
tion) unfailingly links past to present to future. Instead of inference or 
probability, there is certainty, where certainty is defined as outside 
human sensation.
This same aura of certainty and drama also infiltrates media reports of 
scientific findings. Daily, we read news reports about new scientific discov-
eries that have “proven” various things, reports that exaggerate both the 
certainty and the reach of the science. Part of the difficulty thus stems from 
how science is represented as true and certain. Part of this selling of science 
is linked to the necessity for funding: scientists need to sell science in order 
to justify public funding, in order for science to be seen as a public good. 
This reliance on narrative for justification, however, is not limited to the 
recent transformation of Big Science into Massive Science. As Lyotard has 
argued, “scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the 
true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowl-
edge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all” (PC, p. 29). 
According to Lyotard, these narratives of legitimation have traditionally 
come in two varieties: the first emphasizes “humanity as the hero of lib-
erty”; the second stresses the necessity of cultivating the “speculative
36. See Tamara F. Lawson, “Before the Verdict and beyond the Verdict: The CSI Infection 
within Modern Criminal Jury Trials,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 41 (Fall 2009): 
119–73.
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spirit” which restores unity to learning and judges/builds State and Society
(PC, pp. 31, 33).37 The second, with its emphasis on knowledge for knowl-
edge’s sake, is fading, and the first, combinedwith narratives of technology
as ever-more efficient and autonomous, is growing stronger.
This selling of science as true, certain, and efficient not only creates
goodwill towards and awe of science but also shuts down scientific debate
and dialogue by making scientists reluctant to air uncertainties in public
for fear of being recruited and celebrated as deniers, and it contributes to a
paranoid backlash against science and its models. Consider in this light
Jean Baudrillard’s critique of scientific models as “hyperreal,” a thesis that
inspired films such as The Matrix. 38 According to Baudrillard, models of
the future—simulacra or copies without originals—now precede what
they were supposed once merely to represent. These hyperreal simula-
tions, Baudrillard argues, liquidate all referentials, since the real is no lon-
ger necessary to verify these models. Even worse, they artificially
resuscitate the real, thus congealing the world in action, so that in the place
of real action we have a logic of absolute control, which seeks to freeze
everything in place, to reduce everything to its code. Once again, there is
no uncertainty. By reducing everything to its essence, its code, one alleg-
edly has the ultimate society of control because the code encapsulates ev-
erything: the phenomena it refers to and action itself.39 As I’ve argued
elsewhere, this assumption that the code is everything glosses over the
vicissitudes of execution: everything machines and humans do to make
37. The first, which Lyotard argues is gaining new vigor, argues that knowledge finds its
validity in the emancipation and well-being of man—“knowledge is no longer the subject, but
in the service of the subject: its only legitimacy . . . is . . . that it allows morality to become
reality” (PC, p. 36). I want to stress, however, that we cannot accept the current conditions for
scientific research within the United States as either optimal or inevitable. This essay thus is also
a call for a rethinking of how science funding is justified and used. It is thus, alongside other
recent essays, a call for rethinking the university so it serves all directly involved—students,
teachers, and professors—better and so that it engages everyone in a meaningful way.
38. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor,
Mich., 1994), p. 32. According to Baudrillard, one of the most damning and intriguing effects of
simulations is how they usurp the real. Science, he argues, no longer needs its object or nature;
an ideal model no longer needs to sample nature or refer to an object because it captures
phenomena perfectly. Simulation thus differs from representation because representation
“stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real (even if this equivalence
is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Simulation, on the contrary, stems from the utopia of
the principle of equivalence, . . . from the sign as the reversion and death sentence of every
reference” (p. 6). A simulation therefore has no relationship to reality whatsoever; it is not a
copy of anything. For Baudrillard, capitalism inaugurates simulation. Capital stems from the
utopia of the principle of equivalence; in a capitalist economy, everything can be compared to
everything else on the basis of price.
39. Models are often tested by hindcasting, a process by which they are fed historic data in
order to see if it accurately predicts the past.
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p. 246).
40. See Chun, Programmed Visions, chap. 1.
code and its result coincide. By doing so, it trivializes action and makes 
action a foregone conclusion.40 This notion of the hyperreal buttresses the 
bizarre assumption that information encapsulates execution.
Regardless, the dovetailing of the hyperreal / CSI effect and doubts over 
global climate change reveals how systems of truth and justice—even as 
they try to avoid politics—still play out in the court of public opinion, as 
well as pointing to fundamental similarities between scientific and political 
decision making. The standards applied to determining global climate 
change are arguably the same standards used within the US courtroom; 
one must convict someone if one is sure beyond reasonable doubt that the 
suspect committed a crime. Institutes such as Heartland have done an 
excellent job producing doubt. Unreasonable expectations regarding the 
accuracy and scope of science have made these doubts seem, to some, 
reasonable; they have made waiting for results—in essence giving up on 
the future—seem rational. Perversely, these models are condemned be-
cause they are not hyperreal enough, and action is deferred not through 
these models but rather through endless debates about these models. If we 
are to displace this debate, we need to do something other than repeat the 
opinions of scientific experts; we need to address public expectations and 
to provide ways of dealing with uncertainty in nonforensic ways. We need 
to disentangle knowledge, and action from the knot of programmability.
Science—almost all forms of science, not simply climate science—
offers probable explanations rather than ironclad and infallible rules. Fo-
rensic proof is provided after an event has happened; a decision will be 
proven to be true based on changes that occur after it or on molecular 
analyses that later reveal the chemical pathways, the shapes of the mole-
cules involved in a correlation. After an event, everything seems certain. 
This is why forensic evidence almost always points to the lack of adequate 
policing or action; it is far easier to discover a pattern of evidence after a 
crime, when the search terms are clear. This forensic logic underlies the 
logic of preemption, which seeks to avoid future events by knowing the 
present and past, by imposing a grid of control that deters all action. 
Rather than taking this view—which is good for verification but not for 
hypotheses—we need to consider the fundamental uncertainties of science 
and politics: the chain of uncertainties starting from the uncertainty 
within science itself as it moves from correlations to causality to the un-
certain step between scientific opinion and political decisions (see “W,”
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The Difficulties of Predicting and Experiencing Global Climate
Change or the Facts, Again
So what does this all mean in terms of understanding global climate
change and generating action to combat it?
First, we need to accept—and disseminate—the fact that climate sci-
ence, like all sciences, is not exact. Because of the number of known and
unknown factors that affect climate and the interactions between them,
predicting and understanding climate is extremely difficult. There is, as
Sabine Niederer has shown, real debate regarding the eventual effects of
global warming.41 Although the basics of global warming are understood,
global climate poses serious challenges to modeling and to experience.
Knowing the effects of increased hydrocarbons within a sealed space and
knowing their effects in the earth’s atmosphere are two very different
things. This is because (1) many different factors affect climate / tempera-
ture; (2) thesemany different factors also affect each other; (3) it is difficult
to exactly measure factors that affect climate; (4) much of the climate
record precedes human-kept records and so we must use historical prox-
ies; (5) climate is not something we immediately experience: we are af-
fected by weather, not climate.
Climate is complex. Climate is the measure and pattern of weather—
temperature, precipitation, humidity, wind velocity, sunshine, and
more—for a particular region over a significant period of time (usually
thirty years). It is affected by the atmosphere, the terrestrial biosphere, the
sun, and the oceans. Understanding and predicting climate requires the
construction of complexmodels, which couple these systems together and
track the effects of factors such as carbon dioxide. Constructing models of
any one of these elements alone is difficult; coupling them in order to
understand the feedback between the various systems is even more so.
Additionally, different models produce very different predictions regard-
ing the effects of increases in greenhouse gases, in large part because of
differing values given to positive feedback (water vapor) between the sys-
tems and because of uncertainties regarding the role of clouds.42
Further, it is difficult to measure and estimate each factor that affects
global climate. Because human records of climate indicators are fairly re-
cent, we need proxies, such as tree rings and ice samples, to measure tem-
41. See Sabine Niederer, “‘Global Warming Is not a Crisis!’: Studying Climate Change
Skepticism on the Web,” NECSUS, 3 June 2013, www.necsus-ejms.org/global-warming-is-not
-a-crisis-studying-climate-change-skepticism-on-the-web/
42. See Brian J. Soden and Isaac M. Held, “An Assessment of Climate Feedbacks in
Coupled Ocean–Atmosphere Models,” Journal of Climate 19 (July 2006): 3354–60,
www.gfdl.noaa.gov/bibliography/related_files/bjs0601.pdf
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perature not only before human records but also before humans existed.
These proxies need to be read, that is, interpreted and standardized. Not
only is it difficult to measure historical data for climate but it is also diffi-
cult to measure these factors in the present. Consider, for instance, the
difficulties of measuring carbon dioxide to determine which parts of the
world act as carbon sinks or sources. Carbon in the lower atmosphere is
measured by ground stations, which are mainly located near the oceans,
since these provide the cleanest signals. However, given that most carbon is
produced over land, this is not optimal. Further, there are a limited num-
ber of ground stations. Although newer satellite technologies promise
more detailed and accurate readings, there are still difficulties to be ad-
dressed (in addition to those introduced by satellite technology). To know
if a location is a source or a sink (to what extent forests serve to mitigate the
amount of CO2 in the atmosphere), these measurements have to be com-
pared to estimates regarding carbon production (from industry records
and others) and be matched against wind patterns. Winds, however, are
difficult to predict. Most carbon models now use sixteen models of wind
patterns to estimate carbon transport, which creates more uncertainty re-
garding the effects of carbon sinks/sources. Every factor measured intro-
duces the possibility of error.43
That we experience weather, not climate, makes things even more dif-
ficult; climate, like risk, is impossible to experience directly. This explains
the conflict between some meteorologists and climate scientists over the
existence of global warming (see “PC”). A day’s weather can be affected by
any number of local patterns and events; there is no one reason that can
account for the strength of a hurricane or the existence or intensity of any
given weather event. Climate is an average over at least thirty years. This is
why glaciers are so important in illustrating climate change; their size is a
measure of climate, not weather. It is perhaps perverse that the measure of
global climate change is the mean—an entity devised to filter change by
producing an average. Personal experience is further challenged by the fact
that in order to combat global climate change we need to act on the basis of
models. Again, these models—if they are to work effectively as models—
cannot be entirely verifiable. This fact, of course, is not limited to global
climate change models; those who believed in the economic model, pos-
ited by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, which showed that in
developed nations a debt/DGP ratio of over 90 percent causes median
growth rates to fall by 1 percent, fought for austerity measures to prevent
43. See Kevin Robert Gurney et al., “Towards Robust Regional Estimates of CO2 Sources
and Sinks Using Atmospheric Transport Models,” Nature, 7 Feb. 2002, pp. 626–30.
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the United States from reaching that level.44 In terms of global climate
changemodels and unlike the GDP to debt ratio, it is extremely difficult to
reverse climate change.
Climate change skeptics, both within and without the larger scientific
community, have exploited these aforementioned uncertainties to deny
the very existence of climate change. Here are myths used most against
arguments against global warming, according to Skeptical Science: the cli-
mate’s changed before; it’s the sun; it’s not bad; there’s no consensus; it’s
cooling; models are unreliable; the temperature record is unreliable; ani-
mals and plants can adapt; it hasn’t warmed since 1988; Antarctica is gain-
ing ice.45 “Skeptical” scientists in particular have attacked the logic and
reality of representations/simulations of climate change.46 They have also
challenged the legitimacy and politics of climate scientists, accusing them
of being either greedy researchers, who have created global climate scares
using various “tricks” in order to get more money, or as socialists with
anticapitalist agendas.
Countering these objections through line-by-line rebuttals is important
but is not enough because of core challenges posed by global climate
change to the relationships between experience and causality, politics and
science. These challenges are not limited to global climate change models;
they resonate widely, from earthquake prediction to economicmodels. So,
how are we to argue for the productive relationship among models, sci-
ence, and uncertainty? How can we emphasize their relationship to hypo-
theses and other forms of reasoning that lie beneath, that are less than
reality, but not for that reason less important and scientific? Perhaps one
44. See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” NBER
Working Paper Series (Jan. 2010), www.nber.org/papers/w15639. On the influence of Reinhart’s
testimony at the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, see Josh Irons and
John Bivens, “Government Debt and Economic Growth: Overreaching Claims of Debt
‘Threshold’ Suffer from Theoretical and Empirical Flaws,” Economic Policy Institute, 26 July
2010, www.epi.org/publication/bp271/, and Paul Krugman, “The 1 Percent’s Solution,” New
York Times, 25 Apr. 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/opinion/krugman-the-one-percents
-solution.html?hpw&_r2&
45. See www.skepticalscience.com
46. Willie Soon and Sallie Baliunas infamously critiqued the hockey-stick graph by arguing
that, because proxies represent local climate, they “cannot be combined into a hemispheric or
global quantitative composite.” Rather, they should be “considered as an ensemble of
individual expert opinions,” which taken together “reveal that the 20th century is probably not
the warmest nor a uniquely extreme climatic period” (Willie Soon and Sallie Baliunas, “Proxy
Climatic and Environmental Changes of the Past 1000 Years,” Climate Research 23 [Jan. 2003]:
89). They divided the evidence by locale and proxy and emphasized the effects of the mini-ice
age and the medieval warming period. Although this article was roundly criticized and the
editors of Climate Research resigned in response to this criticism, Soon and Baliunas’s article
inspired criticism of Mann’s methodology by physicists such as the aforementioned Richard
Muller.
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way forward is to embrace Latour’s insight that “if something is con-
structed, then it means it is fragile and thus in great need of care and 
caution” (W, p. 246). In this light, science is one of the most powerful 
creative industries. Perhaps.
Hypo-Real: Created, So Therefore Good
To engage with facts as threadlike and fragile, Latour creates the neol-
ogism factish from fetish and fact (both words stem from the Latin word for 
made). Factishes reveal that construction does not equal falsity; rather it is 
because something “is constructed that it is so very real, so autonomous, so 
independent of our own hands.”47 A well-constructed factish, in other 
words, is not “made up” but rather a vibrant and pulsing network that 
generates “circulating reference, accuracy, and reality” (PH, p. 272).48 
Words and things—numerical representations and the things they refer 
to—are not separate; reference circulates between the many translations 
between words and things that underlie scientific research.
Understanding factishes—rather than condemning every approxima-
tion and translation as inaccurate proxies—entails engaging with the 
chains of translation that take place between things and words, as well as 
with translations between various levels of thought. For instance, to doc-
ument the relationship between climate and forest growth—and thus also 
to understand the relationship between forests and carbon dioxide lev-
els—many different measurements are taken. In the tropics, where tree 
rings do not exist, growth is measured either manually using diameter 
readings or mechanically using dendrometer bands: both entail field trips 
to the forest by a team of researchers and workers to record these measure-
ments. To understand the effect of climate on tree growth, one study in-
cluded readings from every tree with a diameter over one centimeter from 
four forests (two in Malaysia, one each in Panama and Thailand), and then 
correlated diameter measurements, taken every five years, against changes 
in average mean incoming solar radiation, annual total precipitation, and 
daily minimum temperature at each site.49 For climate data, they used 
monthly data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
47. Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 
1999), p. 275; hereafter abbreviated PH.
48. Science is the “gaining of access, through experiments and calculations, to entities that 
at first do not have the same characteristics as humans do. . . . What working scientists want to 
be sure of is that they do not make up, with their own repertoire of actions, the new entities to 
which they have access” (PH, p. 259).
49. See Shirley Xiaobi Dong et al., “Variability in Solar Radiation and Temperature 
Explains Observed Patterns and Trends in Tree Growth Rates across Four Tropical Forests,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society, Biological Sciences 279 (Oct. 2012): 3923–31.
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tion (NOAA) and the National Centers for Environment Prediction’s
(NCEP) Climate Prediction Center rather than local sources because there
were no meteorological stations on site and because they could not verify
the quality and accuracy of data obtained from the local meteorological
stations.50 Estimates for solar radiation forcing were also taken from a
US-based source: the International Satellite Cloud Climatology Project
(ISCCP). Previous studies had revealed conflicting evidence regarding the
effects of long-term temperature changes on forest growth and productiv-
ity; one study, based in the Amazon, concluded that changes in climate
were stimulating growth and productivity in forests; another, based in
Costa Rica, showed the opposite. To resolve this conflict, they turned to
those four forests because there existed long term census data for them. To
normalize the data, they excluded trees with biologically unrealistic
growth rates and trees that had been measured at different heights. The
study found that two different and independent variables affected tree
growth: minimum temperature and solar radiation. Further, these factors
had a greater impact on smaller trees than on more mature ones. These
arguably explained the differences reported earlier and thus help elucidate
the larger question: to what extent will forests serve as sources or sinks in
the future?51
Many things can affect diameter readings. As well, diameter readings
are fast—and thus suitable for large scalemeasurements—but they are not
as accurate as other methods such as dendrometer bands (however, plac-
ing these bands on trees takes some skill and surface preparation, and they
can become damaged by animals or falling debris). Diameter tape mea-
surements are very good for infrequentmeasurements and for calculations
that do not need extreme accuracy.52 In the gathering of physical data,
compromises are made in order to negotiate between the various goals:
50. The interactions between Western research scientists and the locations they study is
fascinating and too large a topic to be addressed properly here.
51. To answer this question, another set of correlations and references need to be put into
place. First, it is assumed that trends and variations in climate affect short-term physiological
performance in plants. This in turn affects long-term demographic performance: mortality,
growth, and reproductive rates. This in turn affects the long-term structure of the ecosystem
and the accumulation of carbon in the ecosystem, which is released through the burning of
trees and soil. Each step’s assumption builds on the other, and these various levels are
intertwined through the chains of reference—the measurements—that circulate between them.
In order to create hypo-real models, theory is essential, and theory and practice should shape
each other. To understand why solar radiation would play a great factor in tree growth, one
needs to understand plant physiology and also forest dynamics, as well as the difference
between temperature and solar radiation.
52. See Bobby D. Keeland and Patricia Joy Young, “Construction and Installation of
Dendrometer Bands,” National Wetlands Research Center, www.nwrc.usgs.gov/Dendrometer/
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ease of measurement, accuracy of measurement, the importance of scale, 
and the soundness of any sample. Also, there are uncertainties introduced 
by variations in human observers and frequency of observation. The 
coarseness of data, however, does not necessarily compromise the calcu-
lation or the larger estimate or hypothesis. To insist on absolutely accurate 
data is sometimes to ensure that no measurements and calculations are 
ever made; further, inaccuracy in tree diameter readings is hardly the lim-
iting factor in understanding the effects of climate on tropical rainforests.
The conclusion reached does raise the question: why are these correla-
tions significant, and are they causal? What other reasons are there for 
these changes and what other conclusions could be drawn? Clearly, these 
factors were correlated because of our basic understanding of plant phys-
iology; solar radiation and temperature affect the rate of photosynthesis. 
However, given that most empirical science works via uncovering corre-
lations, how are we to determine the force and primacy of various corre-
lations? For instance, most news reports that claim that science has 
“discovered” a gene responsible for a certain action report a discovered 
correlation rather than a causal relation. That is, such discoveries do not 
usually include knowledge of the specific chemical pathways involved (this 
often comes later, if it does) but rather the discovery of a solid correlation 
between the presence of certain genes (or gene mutations) and certain 
expressed characteristics. The force of correlation is perhaps most heavily 
debated and hyped within economic models, such as the controversy men-
tioned earlier regarding GDP to debt ratio.
All these examples raise the further question: what is the relationship 
between knowing these correlations and acting on them? In the case of the 
GDP to debt ratio finding, this “fact” was used constantly by Republicans 
in the US Congress during debates regarding the budget and the effects of 
austerity versus stimulus. That this correlation was later called into ques-
tion when it was vascularized by the team from the University of Massa-
chusetts, Amherst did not change its impact. Mann’s hockey-stick graph 
became the iconic visual used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to explain global climate change. Once attacked, though, it 
became a lightning rod, an example not of global warming but of bad 
science.
Correlating Causation
The question of the relationships between correlation and causality, 
causality and action is especially pressing given the rise of big data and the 
ways in which it allegedly dispels the very need for causality. As Wired 
editor Chris Anderson has controversially asserted, “the data deluge makes
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the scientific method obsolete.” It is not only humanists who are discuss-
ing “the end of theory.”53 Anderson’s article remarkably places statistical
analysis outside theory, as though statistical analyses designed to recognize
significant patterns were not themselves theoretical. It also assumes that
data are simply raw and can speak for themselves. (As Lisa Gitelman has
shown, “raw data is an oxymoron.”)54 Regardless, big data is challenging
our common perceptions of causality because clearly noncausal rela-
tions—seemingly accidental relations—seem to be better predictors of
future behavior than so-called essential relations.
Most forcefully, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier have ar-
gued that “society will need to shed some of its obsession for causality in
exchange for simple conditions: not knowingwhybut onlywhat.”55Theyoffer
as evidence cases that have become widely canonized: FICO’s “Medical Ad-
herence Score,” which determines how likely patients are to takemedications
regularly based on information such as car ownership; and Target’s “‘preg-
nancy prediction’” score based on the purchase of vitamin supplements and
unscented lotions (BD, pp. 56, 58). Based on these cases, they contend that not
only doweneed to give up on causality because knowingwhat is happening is
more important than why but we also need to give up on causality because
often “it’s little more than a cognitive shortcut that gives us the illusion of
insight but in reality leaves us in the dark about the world around us” (BD, p.
64).56 Further, we need to let go of our penchant for accuracy. In terms of big
data, accuracy isnotneeded; it isbetter tohavea lotofnoisydata thanasmaller
set of accurate data. Chaos theory aside, knowing about that butterfly’s flutter
in South America does not matter.
The rise of big data in many ways seems antithetical to debates around
climate change. Often the very same folk calling into question global cli-
mate change on the basis of “poor” data are the very ones celebrating and
exploiting big data, poor or not. Similarly, many of those who see the
53. See Chris Anderson, “The End of Theory: The Data DelugeMakes the ScientificMethod
Obsolete,”Wired, 23 June 2008, www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/16-07/pb_theory
54. See “Raw Data” Is an Oxymoron, ed. Lisa Gitelman (Cambridge, Mass., 2013).
55. See Victor Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (New York, 2013), p. 7; hereafter abbreviate BD.
56. Big data, by relying on correlations, can predict the future because it gives up on
causality as a limiting factor: “there is nothing causal between car ownership and taking
antibiotics as directed; the link between them is pure correlation. But findings as such were
enough to inspire FICO’s chief executive to boast in 2011, ‘We know what you’re going to do
tomorrow’” (BD, p. 56). Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier offer as evidence the already canonical
examples of big data’s success: how Target exposed a girl’s pregnancy to her father before she
did; statistical methods that produce better translations than grammatical ones; and Amazon’s
automatic recommendation system, which resulted in more purchases than its editors’ choices
(see BD, p. 51).
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possible catastrophes predicted by climate scientists as improbable also 
buy lottery tickets (this is a correlation that should be explored, not be-
moaned). Importantly, the correlations exposed and exploited by much 
consumer uses of big data focus on the amplification of consumer behav-
ior; if you’ve bought this, you probably also want to buy that. The idea is to 
program customers to act in certain ways (or to predict present conditions 
or future habits) based on habits already contracted. Because most big data 
analyses are not interested in changing behavior radically (or in prevention)—
but rather in amplifying certain existing behaviors (and preempting oth-
ers)—big data is not interested in causes but in proxies. Algorithms based 
on correlations are also used by intelligence gathering services to create 
lists of probable suspects/potential terrorists. However, as the recent Bos-
ton bombings reveal, relying on statistical patterns and probabilities leaves 
you vulnerable to more improbable suspects, to whom such models grant 
more safety. The light of big data creates big shadows.
So, how can we use hypo-models not simply to amplify or preempt 
human behavior but rather to change it? To produce the improbable 
rather than the probable? How can we make correlations produce under-
standing and a fundamental openness to the future? That is, how are we to 
consider the relations between correlation and the future, not to shut 
down the future—to shape it into what is most statistically probable—but 
to deal with invisible forces that we cannot entirely know, but need none-
theless to change? To do so, we need to follow Beck’s call to create an 
alternative to the relationship between practice and theory. However, 
rather than base this alternative on the fact that we can learn from past 
mistakes (Beck’s formulation), we need to start from the fact that it is 
because we cannot learn from the past—at least not directly—that we need 
an alternative theory of theory and practice, an alternative approach to the 
future that approaches invisible causalities through proxies and that cre-
ates new habits obliquely through correlations.
This point is made clearly by the more recent work by NASA climatol-
ogist Jim Hansen. Hansen, who for years has been warning of global warm-
ing and the importance of public information dissemination, in 2012 wrote 
a remarkable article, “Perception of Climate Change,” in which he ad-
dressed directly the impossibility of experiencing climate. “The greatest 
barrier to public recognition of human-made climate change,” he con-
tends, “is probably the natural variability of local climate. How can a per-
son discern long-term climate change, given the notorious variability of 
local weather and climate from day to day and year to year?” (“PC”). This 
again is the imperceptibility of risks, which Beck addressed. Hansen, how-
ever, does not give up on the primacy of human experience. Rather, refer-
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ring to a survey that “confirms that public opinion about the existence and
importance of global warming depends strongly on their perceptions of
recent local climate variations,” Hansen explores the notion, “suggested
decades ago . . . that by the early 21st century the informed public should be
able to recognize that the frequency of unusually warm seasons had in-
creased, because the ‘climate dice,’ describing the probability of unusually
warmor unusually cool seasons, would be sufficiently loaded (biased) as to
be discernible to the public” (“PC”). Thus, more important than verifying
and explaining models is relating extreme weather events, such as recent
heat waves and droughts, to ongoing global warming.
Although Hansen and others “were motivated in this research by an
objective to expose effects of human-made global warming as soon as
possible,” they used “an empirical approach that does not require knowl-
edge of the causes of observed climate change. We also avoid any use of
global climate models, instead dealing only with real world data” (“PC”).
They conclude that the climate dice are now so loaded that “the probability
distribution for temperature anomalies has shifted more than one stan-
dard deviation towards higher values . . . [, whichmeans] that a perceptive
person old enough to remember the climate of 1951–1980 should recognize
the existence of climate change, especially in summer” (“PC”). The use of
“real data” is not outside the use of models, in particular statistical models
of probability, and, again, data is never raw. Regardless, the Hansen piece
nicely addresses the importance of revealing correlations that imply cau-
sality, of using proxies for globalmean temperature.Weird weather events
are arguably side effects of the rise in globalmean temperature; deviations,
because they depend on means, are usually determined subsequent to
means. These deviations, however, are open to experience and resonate
most widely. The experience of the anomaly—of that which cannot be
entirely explained and thus invokes new rules to explain it—leads to pro-
found questions about the future and politics. Habitual disruptions of the
habitual are key to experiencing the inexperienceable.
Hansen’s work also reveals that the link between correlation and causality
may be uncertain (onemight say undecidable), but itmust be conjectured for
a future that is anything other than one programmed by probabilities. By
givinguponcausality,where causality is understoodasXeffectingY(however
fraught it is andhasalwaysbeen),weare foreclosing the future; theuncertainty
regarding causality does not deride the importance of causality but under-
scores it. To return to the canonical examples referred to earlier—theMedical
Adherence and the pregnancy prediction scores—these metrics reveal the
complexities of human culture and the role it plays in creating rela-
tions. The buying of certain vitamins during the thirdmonth of a pregnancy
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shows the extent to which pregnancy in the United States has become carefully 
managed and programmed. The links between the Medical Adherence score 
and car ownership are multiple: from the convenience often afforded to au-
tomobile drivers over public transport (especially bus) users to simple indica-
tors of socioeconomic class. To put it slightly differently, that causality is 
fictional—as those who trumpet big data argue—is not the death of causality 
but rather its potential. Causality, as empiricists have argued, constitutes the 
“‘always’” through an extension of reason that transcends the given (ES, p.  67).
I am willing to wager that the debate over global climate change will be over 
soon, not because people believe models or means, but because proxies, such 
as weird global events, will convince the majority of its existence. (And also 
because geoengineering is becoming a reality.) I am further willing to wager 
that the end to this debate will not mean the end of global climate change. The 
challenges that global climate change and big data together pose undermine 
not only the relationship between the accidental and the essential but also that 
between reason and action, passion and habit; they undermine the odd as-
sumption that information/code automatically executes.
Habits of Living
To conclude, I want more explicitly to draw together the various 
threads on causality in this paper through Deleuze’s exposition on Hume, 
Experience and Subjectivity. It is no surprise that Hume—in particular his 
linking of causality with habit—is the popular big data philosophical ref-
erence, appearing in articles in Wired magazine and in PowerPoint pre-
sentations made by those advising the US intelligence community.57 
Although this reference often is made glibly, it highlights the importance 
of habits to understanding how causality, correlation, and anticipation 
work in the era of risks that defy human experience. Although global cli-
mate change and big data are difficult to grasp because they create infer-
ences based on relations that escape human experience, they do not affect 
the work of habit, in particular, habit as anticipation.
Deleuze, reading Hume in Experience and Subjectivity (a text that would 
have a profound effect on his later work) outlines the linkage of experience 
and habit in Hume’s theory of causality. Causality, Deleuze explains, does 
not proceed on the basis of certainty (it is not based on intuition or dem-
onstration) but rather on the basis of probabilities (see EC, p.  65). This
57. See Jonah Lehrer, “Trials and Errors: Why Science Is Failing Us,” Wired, 16 Dec. 2011, 
www.wired.com/magazine/2011/12/ff_causation/all/1, and Chris Ray, Bryan Ware, and Gary 
Nan Tie, “Big Data, Systemic Risk and the US Intelligence Community,” Enterprise Risk 
Management Symposium, Chicago, IL, 22–24 April 2013, www.ermsymposium.org/2013/
concurrent-sessions.php
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does not mean that causality is derived from probability; causality forms
gradually and is the result of habit, which presupposes experience. Accord-
ing to Hume, “experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several
conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is another principle, which de-
termines me to expect the same for the future.” Experience presents cases
of constant conjunction to the inspecting mind, but “repetition by itself
does not constitute progression” (EC, p. 67). Habit allows the mind to
transcend experience—to reason about experience, “as it transforms belief
into a possible act of the understanding” (EC, p. 68). Causality is thus both
“the union of similar objects and also a mental inference from one object
to another” (EC, p. 68).
Crucially, though, habit and experience are not—and do not—always
have to be unified. Habit poses the possibility of falsifying experience, for
it “can feign or invoke a false experience, and bring about belief through ‘a
repetition’ which ‘is not deriv’d from experience’” (EC, p. 69). These be-
liefs, however inevitable, are, Hume stresses, illegitimate; they “form the
set of general, extensive, and excessive rules that Hume calls nonphilosphi-
cal probability” (EC, p. 69). To correct these beliefs, the understanding
intervenes through a corrective principle that restrains belief to the limits
of past experience—to the “rules of philosophical probabilityor the calculus
of probabilities” (EC, p. 69). So, although “the characteristic of belief,
inference, and reasoning is to transcend experience and to transfer the past
to the future; . . . it is still necessary that the object of belief be determined
in accordancewith a past experience” [EC, p. 71]). This passage clarifies the
challenge posed to understanding by unimaginable risks; in a risk society,
understanding can neither draw from experience (the conjunctions of ob-
jects from the past) nor be corrected by it. In reflexive modernity, this
unleashing of habit from experience does not lead to the end of knowl-
edge—to “errors and lies” (as in Hume’s formulation [EC, p. 71])—but
rather to unexperienceable yet scientific knowledge. Science, in the era of
both global climate change and big data, it would seem, survives via habits
(inferences between objects that link the past to the future). In Humian
terms, they achieve the creativity ofmorality and art (seeEC, p. 71). (Again,
science can be seen as a creative industry in a formulation that resonates
strongly with post-World-War-Two representations of scientists as cre-
ative men.)58
Not surprisingly, habits themselves have become the focus of analyses
in fields as diverse as critical theory, business psychology, economics, and
58. See Vannevar Bush, “Memex Revisited,” New Media, Old Media: A History and Theory
Reader, ed. Chun and Keenan (New York, 2006), pp. 85–95.
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60. William James, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (1890; New York, 2007), 1:121.
61. The idea of habits as ideology in action resonates with Slavoj Žižek’s early reformulaton
of ideology as persisting in action rather than knowledge. Ideology is structured, he argues, as a
fetish: I know very well that X is not Y, yet I persist in treating X as Y; see Slavoj Žižek, The
Sublime Object of Ideology (New York, 1989).
62. See Wood and Neal, “A New Look at Habits and the Habit-Goal Interface.”
63. See CatherineMalabou, “Addiction and Grace: Preface to Fe´lix Ravaisson’sOf Habit,” in
Fe´lix Ravaisson,Of Habit, trans. Clare Carlisle andMark Sinclair (New York, 2008), pp. vii–xx.
64. Habit, which exists beneath personality and consciousness, takes a change from the
outside and makes that change more and more a change generated from the inside, thus
turning receptivity into spontaneity and enabling the organism to create its own reward.
biology.59 As a way to integrate experiences that exceed general rules, the
habitual allows us to engage the remainders, or exceptions to, rational
choice, experienced or not—from consumers who do not act as game
theory would predict to constantly-failing dieters. Habits are how causality
(anticipation, belief) persists after rationality.
Habits are strange, contradictory things. Habits are human-made nature; 
they are practices acquired through time that are seemingly forgotten about 
as they move from the voluntary to the involuntary, the outer to the inner. As 
they do so, they penetrate and define a person; a habit was traditionally an 
outer garment, such as a nun’s habit. More darkly, they take on a life of their 
own, independent of an individual’s will (drug habits). William James called 
habits “the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative 
agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves 
the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor.”60 Habit, that 
is, is ideology in action.61 At the same time, habits are viewed as central to 
individuality; they not only mark individual difference, they also give an indi-
vidual the time she or he needs to attend to other things, to think, while at the 
same time marking an individual’s lack of self-control, since habits are mainly 
automatic actions prompted by outside stimuli.62
As Catherine Malabou has outlined in her preface to Fe´lix Ravaisson’s
Of Habit, habits are usually understood in two ways:63 first, as mechanical
repetition that erodes what is distinctively human; second, as fundamental
to life, to how we persist. Although a full explanation of Ravaisson’s text is
outside the parameters of this essay, Ravaisson, who is firmly in the second
camp, stresses that habit is not instinct; it is not a natural, automatic re-
sponse. Rather, habit signals a change in disposition—indeed a disposition
towards change—in a being that does not change, even as it does change.
Habit, that is, comes from a change—it is a reaction to a change—that
remains beyond that change.64 (The current weakness of big data—one
59. See “Habit,” a special issue of Body and Society 19 (June–Sept. 2013); and Wendy Wood
and David T. Neal, “A New Look at Habits and the Habit-Goal Interface,” Psychological Review
114 (Oct. 2007): 843–63.
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that will probably soon be corrected—is that many of its algorithms as-
sume that habits are stable rather than themselves constantly changing.)
Habit occurs when understanding becomes so strong that it is no longer
reflected, when an action is so free that it anticipates and escapes will or
consciousness, or when a being’s repeated actions assuage its own needs.
Habit, Ravaisson stresses, is intelligence without will or consciousness.
This move towards habit—in both materialist critical theory and neo-
liberal economics—should be questioned, but it points to the fact that
habit is arguably what culture can be and is in the era of neoliberalism, in
an era in which, asMargaret Thatcher argued, there is no society. Society is
not a negative entity based on laws that restrict but rather a positive and
creative institution that, as Hume argues, integrates human partiality (see
EC, chap. 2). In place of society and government as positive entities that
extend sympathies, create loyalties, and correct inequalities, we have the
reification, manipulation, and extension of habits. It is no accident that
reactions to environmental disasters have been framed in terms of indi-
vidual habits: reduce, reuse, recycle. More positively, as Hansen’s use of
weird weather events reveals, changes to habitual relations are a powerful
way of making vivid scientific estimations and thus registering change.
More negatively, the focus on habits exaggerates the effects of individual
actions, when in fact global climate change stems largely from industrial
uses of hydrocarbons.
Habit underscores the elliptical relationship between action and reason.
Habit, initially the product of intention, also acts outside intention. Most
strongly, habit repeats action in the face of intentions and knowledge.
Habit reveals the importance of involuntarymemory to both creating time
for voluntary thoughts and undermining their impact. Action does not
flow from knowledge. As Deleuze points out, reason “does not determine
practice: it is practically or technically insufficient. Undoubtedly, reason
influences practice, to the extent that it informs us of the existence of a
thing, as the proper object of a passion, or the extent that it reveals a
connection between causes and effects as means of satisfaction. But we
cannot say that reason produces an action, that passion contradicts it, or
even that reason thwarts a passion” (ES, p. 33). As work done on habit
change has revealed, the best way to change habits is through training; that
is, a combination of knowledge and repetition can use repetition against
repetition.65
65. See Bas Verplanken and Wood, “Interventions to Break and Create Consumer Habits,”
Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 25 (Spring 2006): 90–103, and Clare Carlisle, “Creatures
of Habit: The Problem of the Practice of Liberation,” Continental Philosophy Review 38 (Apr.
2005): 19–39.
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But for Hume and Deleuze, although understanding/causality is key to 
the formation of the subject, passions are primary. Causality matters when 
we care about its ends. Further, passions can create new relations; they can 
take the place of the already existing rules of association and create new 
associations. For Hume, passions are inextricably linked to human expe-
rience because they are affections—impressions of ideas that immediately 
register in terms of true and false. They underlie the system of morality and 
justice, which are, fundamentally, creative and created.
Here is our dilemma and the challenges posed to the affective turn. As 
science increasingly takes the role of culture in building an artificial world 
around us, passions themselves lose their primacy and their link to expe-
rience. Tiziana Terranova’s call for a common passion as the zero ground 
of the political is smart and absolutely correct, but the question is: how to 
create this passion when affection itself cannot grasp the unimpressionable 
risks that threaten us?66 How to make vivid the creative world of science 
without resorting to fantastic CSI-like representations? Both systems of 
knowledge and morality are now based on imagination and creativity, so 
how can we inhabit the world that technology has built? How to inhabit 
habit? We need ways to register and deal with the effects of habituation (of 
correlations with effects). We need hypo-theses that model these correla-
tions and offer calculations and rules to follow. And we need to make 
decisions and coalitions beyond our natural sympathies—and, by doing 
so, invent new relations and futures.
66. See Tiziana Terranova, Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age (London, 
2004).
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